

~~NO FORN DISSEM~~S-2562
st/p/cSignificance of Cambodia to the Enemy

Increasing allied pressure on the Communist military structure in South Vietnam has caused them to depend more heavily on the border areas. Cambodia is increasingly valuable as:

1. A sanctuary to evade allied forces;
2. A refuge for rest, training, and medical care;
3. A route of infiltration of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam.

Our information adds up to an estimate that, since 1964, more than 19,000 infiltrators have come into the South through Cambodia. We base this figure primarily on PW and rallier reports.

Generally speaking, the infiltration trails (see map) continue southward from Laos and cross the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border before reaching the Kompong Cham "knee" (see map). Some come even farther south before crossing, however.

We also know that a portion of the military supplies moving southward from Laos are portered through Cambodia over a network of trails.

We also believe that an important share -- 15 to 20 percent -- of the food requirement of the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam comes from Cambodia. This means a daily flow of about 25 to 35 tons a day, mainly rice.

We do not believe that very much in the way of military supplies reaches the VC/NVA via either Sihanoukville or up the Mekong.

OD/OER
28 December 1967

Ocean-craft on the Mekong

It would be difficult to off-load arms shipments to the VC from ocean-going ships on the Mekong moving either to or from Phnom Penh because under present GVN control regulations:

1. Communist flag ships and cargoes from communist ports can not enter the Mekong.
2. Inspection of all cargoes is authorized.
3. Permission is required for shipment of weapons, ammunition, and other cargoes of military significance.
4. All craft must move in convoys escorted by GVN gunboats while in South Vietnam, both from and to Phnom Penh. Four round trip convoys a month are permitted. Maximum authorized convoy turnaround time in Phnom Penh is only 72 hours.

Shipments of Arms to VC Through Cambodia*As for Sihanoukville,*

There is no tangible evidence of any continuing substantial shipments of arms and ammunition to Communist forces ^{in South Vietnam} through Sihanoukville. The Communists do, however, smuggle small quantities of arms and war-related goods from Cambodia. Some of the smuggled goods probably are small-
 unauthorized divisions from ~~Communist~~ arms imported by the Cambodian government for its own forces.

Known military and military-related goods that have arrived in Sihanoukville are not excessive to Cambodia's needs. *Most of the known shipments occurred in Cambodia by the end of 1966.*
 Recent known military goods arriving include 450 tons of identified

military cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Heping in March, consisting of small arms and ammunition believed contracted for in October 1966 for the

Some military-related cargoes from China, Western Europe and Japan have been discharged at Sihanoukville. A Chinese Communist ship delivered 150 tons of magnesium powder to Sihanoukville in May. A three-ton cargo carried to Sihanoukville in April on a Greek ship under charter to Communist China included detonators and fuses. A Norwegian ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 6 tons of dynamite in May, and a Greek ship, also under Chinese Communist charter, delivered 70 tons of sodium nitrate in September. About 50 tons of explosives loaded in European ports were carried to Sihanoukville on French liners. Explosives and related cargoes were included among the cargoes that arrived from Japan. More than 300 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from Western Europe and several cargoes of medicines from Communist China were delivered to Sihanoukville during the first three-quarters of 1967.

Supplies

Prince Sihanouk announced in November 1967 that Cambodia had a verbal trade agreement with the Vietnamese Communists to deliver rice, medicines, and other goods for payment in dollars. Sihanouk's statement apparently covers past periods and possibly 1968.

Rice is the largest and most important commodity the Vietnamese Communists obtain from Cambodia. The amounts involved, including paddy and milled rice, have been approximately 20,000 tons in 1966 and 1967. Cambodian rice amounts to about 15-20 percent of VC/NVA requirements in South Vietnam.

Cambodian rice is delivered and of particular importance to enemy troops located in the rice deficit areas of the South Vietnam highlands and southern Laos. We do not believe that the enemy obtains Cambodian rice in the delta border area (IV Corps) because he has easy access to South Vietnamese rice. (See map, Border areas 1, 2 and 3).

VC/NVA forces also obtain numerous other commodities from Cambodia such as batteries, cloth, paper, medicines, salt, fish sauce, and hand tools. Many of these purchases take place along the border of South Vietnam's delta provinces because of the easy access to local markets on the Cambodian side.

Some chemicals which the Viet Cong use in making explosives, such as potassium chlorate, ^{are obtained from Cambodia.} In 1963, about 23 tons were captured in small shipments on South Vietnam's delta waterways, particularly the Mekong River. We think this traffic has continued but we lack information as to its present tonnage.

The supplies the enemy obtains from Cambodia are relatively small compared to that obtained in South Vietnam, and only rice appears to be of real significance. Captured documents and interrogations indicate that the enemy makes most of his purchases in Cambodia because of convenience rather than absolute necessity.

Cross Border Trade

Goods and people move freely back and forth across the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia particularly in the delta. The movement of goods is quite substantial and has gone on for years.

As an example of this trade, Saigon beer has been relatively plentiful in Phnom Penh since Cambodia restricted normal imports of beer a few years back. Reflecting trade the other way, Chinese Communist export goods and other commodities from Cambodia are displayed by vendors in Saigon.

We believe the Vietnamese Communists participate only to a small extent in this movement of goods between Cambodia and South Vietnam, but it is often difficult with the flow of information to distinguish that in which the enemy is involved and that which is normal. Many newspaper articles also confuse the two.

*It was not the question of the Mekong Delta. Down the Mekong from
Cameroon.*
Patrol of Mekong Waterways -- Game Warden

US and GVN river patrol operations, known as Operation Game Warden, have been underway in the Mekong Delta area since late 1965. These surveillance and inspection operations employ upwards of 160 waterjet river patrol boats (PBR's), 12 minesweepers, and 12 helicopters.

Although Game Warden operations take place throughout the major tributaries of the Mekong (10 PBR's are stationed at Tan Chau, close to the Cambodian border) the majority of enemy contacts occur on the lower reaches of the Mekong -- the Son Hau Giang, Son Co Chien, and Song Tien Giang Rivers.

Patrol boats observed 58,979 rivercraft during daylight hours in November 1967 and boarded and inspected 35,058 of these. During the same month, 146 suspect vessels were damaged, 101 were destroyed, and 16 captured.

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(Continued)GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS - 11-13 DECEMBER

The following is a summary of GAME WARDEN operations in South Vietnam during the period 110701-180700 EST December:

	<u>DETECTED</u>	<u>BOARDED</u>	<u>MERCHANT SHIPS SIGHTED</u>	<u>CURFEW VIOLATIONS</u>
Craft - day	13,065	7,849	211	0
Craft - night	1,163	707	2	7
	<u>14,228</u>	<u>8,556</u>	<u>213</u>	

Percent of craft boarded: $\frac{8,556}{14,228} = 60.1\%$

Day - 60.1%

Night - 60.8%

Average number of ships in operation - 109.4

Average number of helos in operation - 10.8 (C)

SIGNIFICANT ITEMS

Areas in red on the facing map indicate areas of enemy contact which had the following results:

	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US and RVN		5 UH-1Bs 4 PBRs	None
VC/NVN	43 structures 24 sampans 1 bunker 1 junk	34 structures 27 sampans	2 sampans

(C)

CASUALTIES: US - 8 WIA
VC/NVN - 4 KIA, 8 PERSONS DETAINED

(C)

SOURCE: J-3 (C)


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11-18 December 1967

Market Time Operations


Operation Market Time, the US Navy and Coast Guard sea surveillance of coastal waters off South Vietnam to minimize sea infiltration in coordination with the Vietnamese Navy, was begun in March, 1965.

US forces are authorized to stop and search vessels of any nation within South Vietnam territorial waters. Within 12 miles of the coast, US forces may require identification and intention of vessels of any nation. Supposedly, Naval forces form barriers at the 17th parallel and at the South Vietnam-Cambodian border.

Market Time forces are concentrated near the 17th parallel and along the South Vietnam coast from Vung Tau to Ca Mau peninsula, and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand.

During November, 1967, 36,600 vessels were observed, 8,500 were inspected and boarded, and 17,300 were inspected but not boarded. During the same period, 29 enemy vessels were reported as destroyed. As many as 118,000 vessels are detected each month during periods unaffected by adverse monsoon weather.

Various cargoes -- rice, salt, and medicine -- were captured. The official statistics for the first 10 months of 1967 do not claim the capture of any ammunition or significant quantities of war materiel as a result of Market Time operations.



*Last quarter for which
data are available.*

SHIPPING TO CAMBODIA IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1967

Summary

The only identified military shipment to Cambodia during the third quarter of 1967 was about a dozen cases of small arms ammunition unloaded from a French ship at Sihanoukville.

The importance of Phnom Penh relative to Sihanoukville has increased steadily during 1967 as shown in the following tabulation of ship calls and cargo discharged at Cambodian ports in the first three quarters of 1967:

	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Second Quarter</u>	<u>Third Quarter</u>
	<u>Ship Calls</u>		
Sihanoukville	63	56	56
Phnom Penh a/	74	90	97
Total	137	146	153
	<u>Cargo Discharged (Thousand Metric Tons) b/</u>		
Sihanoukville	98.5	53.0	49.0
Phnom Penh a/	82.0	80.0	90.5
Total	180.0	133.0	139.0

a. Data for Phnom Penh include a small, but unknown, volume of cargo in transit for Laos and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.

b. Data have been rounded to the nearest 500 tons. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Chinese Communist ship Jining in August and consigned to the Cambodian Armed Forces.

Some military-related cargoes from Western Europe and China were discharged at Sihanoukville. The Tatiana discharged 40 tons of explosives in July, and a Greek ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 70 tons of sodium nitrate from China in August. Medical shipments consisted of more than 100 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from Western Europe, small consignments of medicines from Communist China, and some 30 tons of Soviet medicines shipped via Singapore.

Unidentified Cargoes

Most of the 10,500 tons of unidentified cargoes came from Western Europe (7,500 tons), Communist China (2,000), and the entrepôt port of Singapore (500 tons). Some of the commodities included in these cargoes -- largely metals, textiles, and foodstuffs -- have been identified but their quantities are not known.

We have identified 90-95% of the cargo carried on Communist ships arriving at Sihanoukville.

Cargoes coming up the Mekong to Phnom Penh -- and on their route Communist vessels are barred -- are subject to inspection by the South Vietnamese government.

We think, therefore, our cargo information is good, but cannot, of course, guarantee that nothing of a military nature slips through undetected.

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TABLE 5

ESTIMATED DAILY LOGISTICAL RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR NVA AND VC
REGULAR AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM/

Class	Short Tons Per Day					
	Mid-1966		Mid-1967		Mid-1968	
	<u>External</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I (Food) ^{b/}	42-47	190-213	41-46	185-208	43-48	197-220
II & IV (Weapons, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical, Signal, Chemical, etc.)	5-6	18-20	5-6	18-20	5-6	19-21
III (POL)	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
V (Ammunition) ^{c/}	7	8	9	10	10	11
TOTAL	54-60	216-241	55-61	213-238	58-64	227-252

a/ Computed on the basis of actual strength, which is about 70 percent of full TO&E unit strength.

b/ Includes a 15 percent factor for spoilage, but does not include replacement of the substantial quantities of food captured or destroyed.

c/ One-third of the weight of the external requirement represents a packaging factor; two-thirds of the weight is actual ammunition. No packaging factor is included in estimating internal ammunition requirements. The total ammunition requirement does include the external packaging factor.

Revised: 24 August 1967
NIE 14.3-67

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Significance of Cambodia to the Enemy

Allied pressure during 1967 has caused the enemy to depend more heavily on the use of Cambodia. VC/NVA forces / use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary to evade Allied forces; as a refuge for rest, training and medical care; in some degree as a safe route for the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam; and as a source of supplies, most importantly for rice.

3.3(h)(2)

North Vietnamese 3.3(h)(2)

infiltrators to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam during 1966-67 moved on foot through Laos, eastern Cambodia and South Vietnam. Since October 1964 more than 19,000 infiltrators have been traced through Cambodia.

Detailed information on the use of Cambodia as a base area and for the infiltration of troops was recently submitted to the Ad Hoc Inter-agency Committee to Prepare Documentation of Communist Use of Cambodia to Support the War in South Vietnam. This committee was chaired by Evelyn S. Colbert, INR.

Within Cambodia the trail network extends from the Lao border southward to Prey Veng Province although the majority of the infiltrators entered South Vietnam from Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri Provinces. (see overlay).

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Recent known military goods arriving include 450 tons of identified military cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Heping in March consisting of small arms and ammunition believed contracted for in October 1966 for the Cambodian Army. Some military items may have been included among the 2,300 tons of unidentified cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Hang Zhou in January and among the 1,400 tons of unidentified cargo delivered by another Chinese ship in August.

Some military-related cargoes from China, Western Europe and Japan have been discharged at Sihanoukville. A Chinese Communist ship delivered 150 tons of magnesium powder to Sihanoukville in May. A three-ton cargo carried to Sihanoukville in April on a Greek ship under charter to Communist China included detonators and fuses. A Norwegian ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 6 tons of dynamite in May, and a Greek ship, also under Chinese Communist charter, delivered 70 tons of sodium nitrate in September. About 50 tons of explosives loaded in

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Various cargoes -- rice, salt, and medicine -- were captured. The official statistics for the first 10 months of 1967 do not claim the capture of any ammunition or significant quantities of war materiel as a result of Market Time operations.

what does this mean in terms of at least 2 ships which were destroyed with NVN arms - not detected by Market Time but discovered by other means?

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~SHIPPING TO CAMBODIA IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1967SUMMARY

The only identified military shipment to Cambodia during the third quarter of 1967 was about a dozen cases of small arms ammunition unloaded from a French ship at Sihanoukville. Some military items may have been included in a 1,400 ton shipment of unidentified cargo from Communist China that was consigned to the Cambodian Armed Forces. Small shipments^a of military-related cargoes -- explosives and medicines -- arrived at both Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, but there is no evidence of any direct movement of these cargoes to the Viet Cong.

The importance of Phnom Penh relative to Sihanoukville has increased steadily during 1967 as shown in the following tabulation of ship calls and cargo discharged at Cambodian ports in the first three quarters of 1967:

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Cargoes - Sihanoukville

Seaborne imports discharged at Sihanoukville in the third quarter of 1967 were only slightly less than in the second quarter and about one-half of the volume discharged in the first quarter, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Thousand Metric Tons 2/		
	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Second Quarter</u>	<u>Third Quarter</u>
Cement	57.5	9.5	29.5
Coal		14.0	
Metal products	1.5	1.5	.5
Chemicals and explosives	1.5	1.0	1.5
Asphalt; pyrites & rubber		2.0	
Petroleum	5.5		
Woodstuffs	6.5	5.0	2.5
Military	0.5		
Other general cargoes	10.0	4.5	4.5
Unidentified	16.0	11.5	10.5
Total	<u>95.0</u>	<u>53.0</u>	<u>49.0</u>

2. Data have been rounded to the nearest 500 tons. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Military and Military-Related Cargoes

The only military cargo known to have been discharged at Sihanoukville during the quarter was a consignment of about a dozen cases of 7.5 mm and 9mm ammunition from the French cargo liner Tatiana. Some military items may have been included in the 1,400 tons of unidentified cargo in cases delivered by the

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